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We analyse the pass-through of money market rates to retail interest rates at the disaggregate level 
in the Belgian banking market. First, we measure the extent of pass-through for a total of fourteen 
products. We find that the response varies over loans and deposits and depends positively on the 
maturity of the product. Second, the launch of EMU has generally not resulted in more competitive 
pricing by banks. Third, we assess the importance of several biases and find that heterogeneity in 
price-setting behaviour should be accounted for in analysing the pass-through. Fourth, we analyse 
bank-specific determinants of heterogeneous interest rate pass-through. We find a role for capital, 
liquidity and market share and we relate these results to the various channels in monetary policy 
transmission and to the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis in banking. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent years have been characterized by an increasing interest in the mechanics of the 
transmission of monetary policy to the banking sector. Even in the U.S., where bank finance 
is much less predominant than in the Euro area, the issue has attracted considerable attention 
(see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000)). The present paper 
elaborates on the issue by studying the pass-through of market interest rates to retail bank 
interest rates in Belgium, a member country of EMU. Cross-country evidence suggests that 
interest rate behaviour in Belgium is rather representative for EMU as a whole (see e.g. the 
overview in de Bondt (2002)). Our analysis focuses on 1) the measurement of the pass-
through and 2) determinants of differences in pass-through among different types of banks. 
Both from a monetary policy and a banking perspective a thorough understanding of the pass-
through is crucial. On the one hand, measurement of the pass-through provides insight into 
the extent and timing of agents’ reaction to monetary policy, and market conditions more 
generally. Such analysis aids in the comprehension of, for instance, lags in the transmission of 
monetary policy. Investigating determinants of varying responses, on the other hand, can help 
in identifying the exact mechanisms at work in the banking sector. In this respect, pass-
through research is complementary to both the analysis of interest spreads in the banking 
literature and the monetary transmission literature on the importance of the respective 
channels. 
 
The present analysis contributes to the existing pass-through literature in a number of ways. A 
first contribution is related to the uniqueness of the data we use. Contrary to aggregate, 
country-level studies (e.g. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Borio and Fritz (1995), Mojon 
(2000)), we have retail interest rates of individual banks at our disposal (see e.g. Cottarelli et 
al. (1995), Weth (2002), Gambacorta (2004)). This enables us to measure the extent of pass-
through at the micro level and investigate its bank-specific determinants. We find that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in price-setting among banks. On the aggregate level, our results 
confirm the rigidity of prices, especially in the short run. Second, the analysis also comprises 
the liabilities side of retail banking. In contrast to the US (Hannan and Berger (1991), 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992)), there hardly exists evidence on the pass-through for bank 
deposits in EMU. Using data on Belgian banks, we account for some of this shortage. Third, 
we analyse a total of fourteen loan and deposit products, covering about the whole spectrum 
of retail banking activities. In contrast to existing studies, which typically consider only a 
limited number of products, this leaves scope for identifying pass-through characteristics over 
distinct product categories. Indeed, we find that corporate loans are priced more competitively 
than consumer loans. We also uncover a relationship between the product’s maturity and the 
extent of pass-through that calls for a re-interpretation of some previous findings. Fourth, 
having bank balance sheet data allows investigation of factors driving differences in pass-
through (Cottarelli et al. (1995), Bruggeman and Wouters (2001), Weth (2002), Gambacorta 
(2004)). We examine a more comprehensive set of determinants and find, among other things, 
that interest rates of well-capitalized banks are particularly sluggish in their adjustment to 
changing market conditions. Furthermore, our results also confirm the structure-conduct-
performance, rather than the efficiency hypothesis. 
 
Next to using microeconomic data, the paper also attempts to incorporate a number of 
methodological contributions in the setup of our empirical analysis. First, we argue that when 
dealing with retail bank interest rates, one should allow for heterogeneity. Not only fixed (as 
 1 in Gambacorta (2004)), but also random variation over banks should be taken into account. 
Our results confirm the presence of both sources of heterogeneity. Second, we note that 
existing pass-through estimates potentially suffer from several biases. In particular, pass-
through estimates might be contaminated by biases due to lagged dependent variables (e.g. 
Kiviet and Phillips (1994)), nonlinearity (e.g. Pesaran and Zhao (1999)), aggregation (e.g. 
Granger (1980)) or heterogeneity (e.g. Barker and Pesaran (1990)). Whereas previous studies 
often only mention these biases, we provide an indication of the importance of each of them. 
Our results indicate that heterogeneity in retail interest rate data is substantial, and that failing 
to account for this feature will give rise to misleading conclusions. On the other hand, we find 
no evidence to suspect that either lagged dependent variable bias or nonlinearity bias 
contaminates pass-through estimation. A final, but we hope very useful, contribution of our 
analysis lies in the way we test for and infer from cointegration relations. We incorporate 
lessons learned from the “large n, large T”-panel data literature in testing for (Pedroni (1999), 
McCoskey and Kao (1999)) and estimating (Phillips and Moon (1999)) cointegrating 
relations. On the one hand, we obtain a complete distribution of the long-run pass-through 
estimates. As a result, we shed light on the (in)completeness of the pass-through, an issue that 
has received little or no attention in the literature. On the other hand, applications of these 
techniques are not widespread, and almost exclusively cover macro data. In this respect, the 
paper also provides an illustrative (micro) example of some of the advances made in the 
“large n, large T” domain. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the 
dataset. In Section 3 we measure the pass-through. The specificity of the data has implications 
for the econometric approach used in the paper. After elaborating on the methodology, we 
present and discuss our results. Section 4 builds on the previous part and investigates which 





2.  The data 
 
The dataset comprises bank-specific interest rates of the majority of Belgian banks for a series 
of loan and deposit products over the period January 1993 – December 2002. The sample 
period is interesting because it covers a period of six years preceding and four years following 
the start of EMU. From a macroeconomic perspective, the time span connects two episodes of 
weak, or even negative, economic growth, while the interval was characterized by relatively 
robust growth. In our sample period, the Belgian bank industry witnessed a pronounced shift 
in terms of market structure due to a series of mergers and acquisitions, which included all the 
major bank groups. Most large banks opted for the bancassurance model, causing the banking 
system to become more consolidated and more diversified. Both aspects may have an impact 
on the pricing behavior of retail bank products. Finally, the Belgian banking market is 
characterized by a relatively large degree of foreign penetration. Although the number of 
foreign banks is proportionately larger than their market share in various retail markets, it 
gives a rough indication of the market’s contestability. 
 
While aggregated bank retail rates are publicly available (see e.g. ECB, IFS), bank-specific 
rates are not. In Belgium, the central bank (National Bank of Belgium, NBB) conducts a 
2monthly inquiry
1, asking banks what rate they offer or would offer on a range of fourteen 
standardized products
2. The use of standardized products in the analysis has the advantage of 
eliminating to a large extent the effect of non-price competition. Moreover, since the inquiry 
covers high quality debtors, effects of time-varying default premia are also mitigated. Data are 
collected for six loan products and eight types of deposits, with both short and long maturities, 
and oriented both to consumers and firms. We refer to Table 1 for a description of the 
products and the abbreviations that are used for each of the products in the presentation of the 
results. The reporting banks account for more than 90% of (total assets of) Belgian banks
3. 
For all but three
4 of the reporting banks we have the reported information, resulting in a total 
of 388 interest rate series. A second part of the dataset consists of money market interest rates 
of different maturities, which are publicly available. After determining the extent of pass-
through from money market rates to bank-specific retail rates, we investigate the impact of 
bank characteristics on this relationship. We approximate bank characteristics by constructing 
ratios from banks’ balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, which are also obtained from 
the NBB. 
 
Prior to the analysis, some data issues need to be clarified. The first is the treatment of bank 
mergers or acquisitions that have occurred during the sample period. Some studies elect 
merging the interest rate data of merged banks into a single pre-merger series by retroactively 
computing an average interest rate over the whole sample. We do not follow this approach. 
First, such a strategy results in a loss of information. Second, prior to a takeover, it is unlikely 
that banks share the same pricing policy in their loan and deposit markets. Hence, since 
pricing policy is the object of our analysis, we treat banks that were involved in a merger or 
acquisition as different units before the merger, and as one thereafter. Regarding the bank 
retail rates, two adjustments are made. First, in January 1996, the definition for consumer 
credit in the NBB’s inquiry changed, which we accommodate by restricting the analysis (for 
this product only) to the post-1995 period. Second, for mortgages, a (significant) dummy 
enters each regression to account for the level effect of an annual housing fair (“batibouw”) 
affecting the interest rates reported in March. The frequency of the entire analysis is monthly. 
Finally, we restrict attention to those series for which we have at least thirty-six consecutive 
observations. The basic idea is that we require enough observations to estimate a time series 
model, although this requirement is somewhat less stringent when working in a panel context. 
A more technical reason is that having more time series observations than cross-sections 
allows usage of some particularly interesting inference procedures (see Section 3.b.2). The 
final dataset contains 31 banks and a total of 268 retail interest rates. The final dataset is 
unbalanced in the sense that different cross-section units within one panel are not required to 
cover the same time span. Furthermore, panels for different products may cover different 
banks. 
 
We present our summary statistics in the form of a series of charts (see Figure 1)
5. For each of 
the six lending products and the eight deposit products, we show a chart with the following 
                                                 
1 While the inquiry is obligatory only since January 1996, the majority of banks reported voluntarily before that 
date. 
2 The products are standardized in the sense that maturity, amount and debtor quality are stipulated. The loan 
rates in the sample are typically those charged to the most creditworthy borrowers. 
3 Publicly available aggregate bank retail rates, e.g. available from the ECB, are constructed on the basis of these 
inquiries. 
4 From these banks we did not receive the required authorisation. It concerns three relatively small savings 
banks. 
5 In this case charts give more information than a table with simple summary statistics, because it would be 
difficult to capture both time variation and cross-sectional dispersion in a single table. 
 3information: the evolution of the mean product-specific interest rate across all banks with 
reported rates in the sample, the evolution of the highest and the lowest product-specific rate 
charged by any bank in a given month and the evolution of the market interest rate with the 
same maturity as the specific product (dotted ‘+’ line). Over most of the sample period from 
January 1993 to December 2002, interest rates have been declining, a characteristic that can 
largely be explained by the EMU-related convergence of interest rates and the stance of the 
business cycle and of monetary policy. 
 
The general picture that emerges from the loan and deposit panels of Figure 1 is that bank 
retail rates generally follow changes in market rates, but there are clear differences across 
products in terms of speed and magnitude of the adjustment. On the lending side, we observe 
that the correlation between market and bank rates tends to increase with the maturity of the 
products (F5Y and C5Y are long-term corporate and customer loans, respectively). For short-
term trade credit and bank advances (F2Ma and F2Mb), the interest rates offered by banks 
change only slowly and remain constant over various time intervals. For the long-term 
investment loans (maturity five years, F5Y) the association between market and bank rates 
appears to be more pronounced and the difference between the highest and lowest bank rate is 
also smaller. Next to the loan products offered to corporations, we also provide information 
on two typical customer retail lending products, mortgages (C5Y) and consumer credit (C3Y). 
For 36-month consumer credit, the bank rates appear to only loosely follow the corresponding 
market rate and the differences across banks are relatively high. In the case of mortgages the 
correlation between bank rates and the relevant market rate (5-year government bonds) is 
much more pronounced. However, there are considerable differences between the maximum 
and minimum bank rates, leaving scope to investigate bank-specific determinants of the pass-
through. Especially in the first part of the sample period, the minimum mortgage rate tends to 
follow the benchmark government bond yield very closely, while the gap widens somewhat in 
the second part of the sample. 
  
In the case of deposits, shown in the second panel of Figure 1, the association between market 
and retail rates is weakest for the savings accounts (SDA and SDL) and for demand deposits 
(DD). This can partly be explained by some typical features of the Belgian deposit market. It 
has been a longstanding practice of Belgian banks to offer a very low and stable interest rate 
on demand deposits, partly as a compensation for a series of payments services that were 
offered at low prices (cash cards, money transfer). In recent years competition among banks 
in terms of payment service fees has altered this picture. The case of savings accounts is even 
more typical because the interest rates are not subject to normal market forces. The maximum 
base rate on ordinary savings accounts is set by the Ministry of Finance. Customers that 
deposit their savings in these types of savings deposits are granted a partial exemption from 
the withholding tax. However, banks are free to offer higher base rates, but then customers 
have to pay the full withholding tax of 15%. Banks typically increase the potential interest 
rate on ordinary savings deposits by offering an accrual premium (for newly deposited money 
that is maintained on the savings deposit for a minimum time period) or a loyalty premium 
(on stable savings). From the corresponding charts, it is clear that the compensation for 
savings deposits is only broadly related to changes in market rates, often with considerable 
lags. In the case of savings bonds (SB1 and SB5) and time deposits (TD15D, TD3M and 
TD3Y), the evolution of bank retail rates is much more in line with changes in market rates. 
The differences between the maximum and minimum retail rates offered by banks are also 
much smaller than in the case of savings and demand deposits. 
4 
3.  Measurement of the pass-through 
 
In this section we analyse the extent of pass-through from market to retail bank interest rates; 
the next section deals with the determinants. We start by indicating the importance of 
heterogeneity in the analysis. This will result in an estimation strategy that will be used in this 
and subsequent sections. Next, we provide detailed information on model selection. We then 
present our results, compare them with the literature, and discuss some econometric issues 
such as potential biases and alternative estimators. 
 
a)  The estimation procedure 
 
For each of the fourteen products, we consider a separate panel
6. There are several 
characteristics of the data, of the hypotheses we wish to test, and of the underlying theoretical 
framework, that have implications for the way one should address estimation. We now turn to 
each of these. 
 
As our study focuses on both the short and the long-term relation between bank retail rates 
and the market rate, we are interested in the time series characteristics of our data set. Having 
a cross-section of banks per product allows pooling these data and estimating the model more 
efficiently
7. One should, however, be careful in pooling, as there may be considerable 
heterogeneity in the data. This heterogeneity seems especially relevant in our dataset and may 
be twofold: fixed (i.e. bank-specific) or random (i.e. uncorrelated with bank characteristics). 
First, differences in pass-through may be due to differences in bank characteristics. As this is 
one of the hypotheses we wish to test, allowing for fixed heterogeneity is crucial. We address 
issues concerning systematic heterogeneity in the next section, where determinants are dealt 
with. Second, recall that the interest rate data are the outcome of an inquiry, which allows for 
some subjectivity and/or differences in timing of reporting. Furthermore, the inquiry considers 
standardized products and not every bank may offer all the exact products. Allowing for 
random heterogeneity in estimation can capture the effect of measurement error in the data. 
Third, in regressions where bank characteristics are not included it may also mitigate the 
effect of fixed -but not modelled- heterogeneity. Fourth, another objection to pooling the data 
(especially in dynamic models like ours) is given by Pesaran and Smith (1995). They show 
that pooling in heterogeneous dynamic panels gives rise to inconsistent estimates. In Pesaran 
et al. (1999) an estimator is proposed that pools only in the long run, while allowing short-run 
heterogeneity. However, as there is no clear shared theoretical restriction for our cross-
sections (banks), especially not when considering one product per panel, it is appropriate to 
allow for heterogeneity both in the short and the long run. Incorporating heterogeneity is 
feasible in our dataset as the time dimension is large (T ranges from 36 to 120). Hence, unlike 
the “large n, small T”-panel data literature, we are not forced to impose cross-sectional 
parameter equality. Moreover, the stationarity assumption present in that literature can be 
relaxed. Research concerned with “large n, large T”-panels has experienced a vast expansion 
since the mid-nineties. We discuss the implications of that literature for our modelling 
approach in greater detail in Section 3.b. 
 
                                                 
6 Examining cross-product relationships is beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 Throughout the paper, we refer to pooling or pooled coefficients whenever the estimation imposes common 
coefficients over cross-sections. Thus, in our terminology, the traditional pooled, fixed effects and random 
effects estimators all belong to the “pooled” class of estimators. The models we consider have fixed and/or 
random variation in all coefficients, not just in the constant term. 
 5In practice, our estimation strategy has the following implications. When measuring the pass-
through we estimate a pure random coefficient model. This implies that for bank i coefficients 
θ are of the form: 
 
θi = θ + εi , 
 
where θ = Σ wi * θi. In words, individual coefficients are equal to the panel coefficient plus 
some random noise. Typically, the weights wi are either equal, giving rise to the mean-group 
estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), or a function of the respective group-




b)  Model selection and specification 
 
1) Marginal costs 
A first step in measuring the pass-through is determining the relevant marginal cost for each 
product. For almost all products in our dataset, the inquiry specifies a well-defined maturity. 
Hence, a natural choice for the marginal cost of the different products emerges: the money 
market rate with a comparable maturity. As Table 2 shows, this choice is largely confirmed by 
correlation analysis. We use the maximum correlation to determine marginal costs for those 
products for which a reference date was not specified. Table 1 presents all products and the 
chosen comparable money market rates. From an economic point of view, computing the 
pass-through relative to a market rate with comparable maturity rather than to the policy rate 
is important (see also de Bondt (2002)). Doing so, one disentangles the pass-through of 
marginal costs on the one hand, and term structure effects of policy rates
8 on the other. 
 
 2)  Cointegration 
The fact that a considerable part of our sample period is characterised by falling interest rates 
results in nonstationarity for the majority of series in our data set. For modelling purposes, in 
order to avoid spurious results, a natural question to ask is whether the respective retail and 
market rates are cointegrated. Overall, we follow the two-step procedure outlined by Engle 
and Granger (1987). Working in a panel context, however, alters the way one should test and 
estimate these models.  
 
  2.1)  Testing  for  cointegration 
It is common knowledge that standard unit root and cointegration tests have low power. The 
basic advantage of “large n, large T” panels
9 in using these tests is that exploiting the cross-
sectional information improves their power. By now, the literature has established a wide 
variety of panel cointegration tests, surveyed in Banerjee (1999). Most of these tests differ in 
the specification of the null and alternative hypotheses. The arguments stated in Section 3.a 
indicate that we wish to allow for long-run heterogeneity. Therefore, we apply Pedroni’s 
(1999) cointegration test, i.c. the between dimension ADF-test (see also Kao (1999) and 
McCoskey and Kao (1999)). This residual-based test under the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration allows for heterogeneity under the alternative. Moreover, the test does not 
                                                 
8 The term structure effect of policy on market rates is typically not considered in pass-through studies, but is an 
interesting domain on its own. See e.g. Cook and Hahn (1989), Ellingsen and Söderström (2001).  
9 The cross-sectional dimension in our dataset is not large (n≤31) relative to the time dimension (36 ≤T≤120), but 
comparable to that of, for instance, McCoskey and Kao (1999). Furthermore, much of the theoretical results we 
rely on (e.g. Phillips and Moon (1999)) hold for moderate n and large T. 
6require the residuals of different cross-sections to have the same autocovariance process. 
Hence, interest rates are not required to exhibit a common behaviour over different banks. 
 
    2.2) Estimating and interpreting the cointegration relationship 
When estimating a cointegration relation in the univariate case, OLS provides 
(super)consistent estimates. Due to the nonstationarity of the regressors, however, these 
estimators no longer have standard distributions. As a result, most of the pass-through 
literature avoids statistical inference on long-run coefficients
10. One notable exception is 
Mizen and Hofmann (2004), who analyse long-run coefficients using likelihood ratio tests vis-
à-vis the model with complete long-term pass-through. The present paper follows a different 
route, resulting in a complete distribution of the long-run coefficient. 
In a panel context too, one can estimate the cointegration vector by OLS. A crucial difference 
with the univariate case, however, is that the noise in cointegration relations is attenuated 
when estimating over various cross-sections. As a result, Phillips and Moon (1999) show that 
panel estimators of cointegration coefficients converge to a normal distribution. Hence, when 
taking into account the appropriate distribution of the estimators, standard hypothesis testing 
becomes possible on long-run coefficients. The estimator Phillips and Moon (1999) suggest is 
a pooled estimator of the cointegration coefficient that can be interpreted as the average long-
run coefficient of the heterogeneous individual cointegrating relations. 
 
 
The outcome of the cointegration test determines the model that will be estimated. In case of 
stationary residuals, an error correction representation (ECM) of the retail rate exists: 
 
t i t i i l t
q
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li k t i
p
k




1 , * ε γ β α + + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − −
=
−
= ∑ ∑     ( 1 a )  
 
where b = bank rate, m = market rate, t = 1, …, T and incorporation of heterogeneity is clear 
from the “i” subscripts on the parameters (i = 1, …, N). The dynamic heterogeneity is 
captured by estimating (1a) using Swamy’s procedure. The term γi* u i,t-1 captures the 
adjustment towards equilibrium. A significantly negative γi confirms the presence of an 
equilibrium relation. The terms ui,t-1 are the lagged residuals from individual cointegrating 
regressions, conform the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure: 
 
t i t i i t i u m c b , 2 , + + = δ  
 
In order to obtain one average long-run coefficient per product, the cointegrating vector is 
estimated directly using the pooled estimator suggested by Phillips and Moon (1999), which 
allows for long-run heterogeneity. 
 
When a cointegration relation is absent, we estimate an autoregressive distributed lag model 
(ADL) in first differences, again using Swamy’s random coefficient model:  
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10 Remark that the distribution of the long-run coefficient affects the distribution of every intermediate, with the 
exception of the immediate, pass-through. 
 7The final step in model selection is determining the optimal choice of lag length (p, q). We 
use the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion to choose among models containing up to six 
lags (in levels)
11. In the spirit of Granger causality tests, we first determine p, and then q. A 
moving average term is added to each equation to ensure white noise residuals and 




c)  Results 
 
The results are summarized in Figure 2 and Tables 3, 4 and 5. Figure 2 plots the pass-through 
for the different products: the first panel contains the loan products, the second panel presents 
the deposit products. At each date, the pass-through measures the contribution of a 1%-point 
permanent increase in the market rate to the retail bank interest rate. Confidence intervals 
(95%) are computed from 5000 Monte Carlo draws
12, ruling out explosive roots (see e.g. 
Chen and Engel (2004)). Table 3 compares the random with the pooled coefficient model by 
means of likelihood ratio tests. The results always favour the random coefficient model. Table 
4 shows the outcome of the cointegration tests, by means of the adjusted t-statistics for each 
panel. Table 5 summarizes the estimation results
13 and reads as follows. The table consists of 
two parts, one for loans and one for deposits. The first column identifies the specific loan or 
deposit product. Each coloured row contains the point estimates for one (product) panel. 
Within a panel, we restrict attention to the main coefficients of interest: the first three rows for 
each product report the immediate pass-through (ST PT), the long-run pass-through (LT PT) 
and the adjustment coefficient (ADJ). We also report the mean adjustment lag (mean lag) as a 
summary measure in the fourth row. Column 3 contains the actual point estimates and the 
adjacent column presents standard errors on these coefficients. In Column 5 we report how 
much of these standard errors is due to parameter heterogeneity. The remaining columns will 
be explained in the section on robustness checks. 
 
First, for both loans and deposits, the size and significance of the negative adjustment 
coefficients (when estimated) confirm the presence of an equilibrium-restoring relationship. 
This is consistent with the results of the cointegration tests in Table 4. As the t-statistics in 
Table 4 show, the accrual premium on saving accounts is the only panel in which the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected (t-statistic of 1.46). Although the cointegration 
test indicates the presence of a cointegrating relation in the demand deposit panel, its 
adjustment coefficient is only marginally significant
14. Conversely, in the case of trade credit 
(F2Ma) cointegration is confirmed only marginally by the panel ADF test, but its adjustment 
coefficient is highly significant. All other loan and deposit products are cointegrated with 
                                                 
11 We also considered sequential likelihood ratio tests as a selection procedure. For six of the fourteen panels, 
this resulted in the same lag choice. Six other panels had a different lag specification, but did not imply 
significant deviations from the Schwarz model. The remaining two panels had some of the intermediate 
responses lying outside the Schwarz model’s confidence bounds, but never the main coefficients of interest. For 
the remainder of the paper, we consider the more parsimonious (Schwarz) model as our baseline specification. 
12 Although drawing from the distributions of the average parameters implies somewhat more computational 
effort, it is convenient in the sense that it does not require deriving standard errors for the pass-through -using 
e.g. the delta method- for each intermediate date. The resulting confidence bounds would not change very much. 
13 Starting the analysis from 1994 onward, excluding the late 1993 market turbulence due to the EMS-crisis, 
never had a significant impact on the results. 
14 This is also apparent in the lower confidence bound for this product: in the simulations, the adjustment 
coefficient often reaches a level close to zero, resulting in a very slow (or even no) adjustment towards the long-
run relation. 
8their respective comparable market rates. Second, Figure 2 shows relatively large confidence 
intervals, for loans in particular. For the most part, this is due to the amount of cross-sectional 
variation in the pass-through estimates, as the fifth column of Table 5 indicates. We now 
discuss our results for the measurement of the pass-through in detail. 
 
Let us consider the long-run pass-through for loans. Figure 2 and Table 5 show that the long-
run response is one-for-one only for two of the corporate loans, viz. the term (F6M) and 
investment (F5Y) loans (their estimated long-term pass-through is 0.92 and 1.01, respectively, 
see Table 5). Recall that, in contrast to much of the existing literature, the completeness 
hypothesis is now truly tested. Regarding the point estimates, the long-run pass-through is 
relatively low for the two consumer-oriented products (69% for consumer credit and 87% for 
mortgages, products C3Y and C5Y respectively). The fact that the pass-through is often 
incomplete in the long run warrants caution in interpreting results stemming from estimations 
imposing complete long-term pass-through. Conform the bulk of evidence in the literature, we 
find considerable short-term stickiness (see ST PT in column 3 of Table 5), although there are 
differences across the loan products. Just as in the long run, this stickiness is most pronounced 
for the consumer loans in our sample, while only to a lesser extent for firm loans. Regarding 
consumer loans (C3Y and C5Y), at most 40% of the long-term pass-through is adjusted on 
impact, whereas for firm loans (F6M and F5Y) at least 80% of the final response is 
immediately realized. With respect to the speed of adjustment, computation of the mean lag 
reveals a similar result. Banks are slower in their adjustment to market rates for consumer-
oriented products. An interesting result is that long-term adjustment seems more complete for 
both firm and consumer loans the longer their maturities. This result has not been identified in 
previous research due to either a lack of products to compare with, or the use of a short-term 
market rate, rather than one with comparable maturity. Pass-through estimates that do not 
distinguish between marginal cost and term structure effects -using the short-term market rate 
as marginal cost-, typically find the opposite: the pass-through is lower the longer the maturity 
of the product. 
 
The observation that consumers are faced with less competitive pricing is consistent with the 
model of Rosen (2002). The latter argues that the more sophisticated (in terms of search 
intensity and access to alternative finance) customers are, the more complete the pass-through 
will be. Rosen (2002) finds evidence for his model using aggregate U.S. deposit data. 
Interpreting consumers as being less sophisticated than firms, we too find evidence in support 
of his model, but using disaggregated data on loans. The finding that the interest rate pass-
through is faster and more complete for corporate loans than for consumer credit may have 
implications for the ability of the central bank to influence investment versus consumption 
decisions. In particular, the relatively weak pass-through of consumer loans may be a key 
element in understanding why the ECB seems to be incapable of influencing private 
consumption (Angeloni et al., 2003). 
 
The other observation, viz. the longer the maturity of the product, the more complete the pass-
through, is consistent with several theoretical considerations. First, from a general price-
setting point of view, the presence of price staggering induces firms to also consider expected 
future marginal costs in setting today’s prices. As these are not incorporated in the model, this 
might explain the finding of increased stickiness for shorter term products. For these products 
expected future marginal costs are, in line with the pure expectations theory, contained in long 
term interest rates. If the maturity effect would indeed be due to a misspecification of 
marginal costs, we should not find it when measuring the pass-through relative to a longer 
term money market rate. Thus, as a robustness check for the maturity effect, we also estimate 
  9the pass-through of the five-year money market rate to each product’s interest rate. While 
point estimates (obviously) differ, the positive relation between the pass-through and the 
maturity of the product still stands
15. Thus, we find that the maturity effect is robust to the 
specification of marginal costs. Secondly, the longer the maturity of a product is, the larger 
the scope for moral hazard phenomena to occur. In an attempt to avoid this, banks can follow 
the market more closely (reflected in a higher pass-through)
16. Thirdly, products with longer 
maturities are typically those with large underlying amounts. The higher the amount of the 
loan, the more significant interest payments become for the customer. Hence, for these 
products the search for banks offering competitive conditions is more intense (Stigler (1961)). 
Increased customer search implies more competitive behaviour among banks, and thus a more 
complete pass-through. 
 
Turning to deposits, an inspection of the estimates in the second panel of Table 5 reveals that 
we can distinguish two groups of deposit products with respect to interest rate pass-through: 
time deposits and savings bonds on the one hand, and current and savings accounts on the 
other. The second panel of Table 5 shows that complete long-run pass-through is always 
rejected statistically, although only marginally so for both the time deposit and savings bond 
with long maturity (the point estimates of 0.98 and 0.96, respectively, for products TD3Y and 
SB5 are close to 1). For time deposits and savings bonds point estimates of the long-run effect 
are found to be higher for longer maturities. Thus, liabilities seem to exhibit a similar maturity 
effect as the one found for loans. Although there is some immediate stickiness, adjustment to 
the long-run level is rapid. Table 5 shows that mean lags for time deposits and savings bonds 
are typically very low, mostly below 1.5 months. Demand and savings deposits, on the other 
hand, show a different picture. First note that the reward on savings deposits is threefold: it 
consists of a base rate augmented with a loyalty premium and/or an accrual premium. Figure 
2 reveals that the accrual premium (plus the base rate) banks offer does not react in response 
to changes in money market rates. Marginal costs do play a role in the determination of the 
savings’ loyalty premium. The response of the latter is very similar to that of demand 
deposits. Both these retail rates show considerable short-term stickiness. The estimated 
immediate pass-through is 6% for the loyalty premium and 14% for demand deposits. Even in 
the long run, the response is far from complete (63% and 49%, respectively, and these 
estimates are significantly different from one). Moreover, adjustment is particularly sluggish 
for both these products, as indicated by their mean lags (up to 7 months for SDL). Hence, the 
Belgian bank deposit market seems to consist of two distinct segments. The first is the market 
for time deposits and savings bonds, where banks seem to follow changes in market 
conditions quite rapidly in their competition for the deposits of companies and households. 
The second is the segment of current and savings accounts, where adjustments to market 
conditions are much slower and competitive pressure seems to be lower. 
 
                                                 
15 For brevity, we do not report the exact results, but they can for the long-term pass-through largely be inferred 
from the correlations in Table 3. There it is apparent that considering expected marginal costs (in terms of longer 
term market rates) does not entail a more similar pass-through for long and short term products. 
16 The effects of asymmetric information have somewhat sharper predictions for asymmetry in pass-through. 
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d)  Issues 
 
This section and the accompanying appendices elaborate on the measurement results 
presented above. Firstly, as in de Bondt (2002), we analyse changes in pass-through after the 
introduction of the euro. Secondly, we describe the effect of using an alternative estimation 
strategy. Thirdly, all pass-through estimates potentially suffer from a bias due to either 
nonlinearity, the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model, or both. We provide 
results based on some alternative estimators that correct for these biases. Finally, we 
investigate how our results relate to those in the literature that use different estimation 
procedures or data on a more aggregated level. 
 
EMU results 
After the completion of the EU single market in 1993, the introduction of the euro in 1999 
was intended to be the final milestone in the creation of a truly integrated banking market in 
the Eurozone. However, studies on the remaining legal and cultural barriers (see Heinemann 
and Jopp (2002)) and empirical evidence on the pricing of retail banking products (see 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002)) indicate that the degree of integration of Eurozone bank 
markets differs markedly between the wholesale, corporate and customer retail market 
segments. Within the context of interest rate pass-through, de Bondt (2002) and Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004) provide evidence suggesting less competitive behaviour after the launch of 
EMU. Similar to those studies, we re-estimate the pass-through for the EMU period (1999-
2002) separately
17. The results are presented in the right-hand panel of Table 5 and tend to 
confirm the weakening of the pass-through. Moreover, the variety of products in our analysis 
yields some additional insights. 
 
Concerning the bank assets in our analysis, once again, a distinction should be made between 
firm and consumer-oriented products. Comparison of Columns 3 and 10 in Table 5 shows that 
the shift to EMU seems to have resulted in less competitive pricing of consumer products. 
From an economic point of view, the drop in both immediate and long-term pass-through is 
considerable for mortgages and consumer credit  (e.g. the long-term pass-through for 
consumer credit is 0.58 in the EMU era compared to 0.69 for the full sample, which only 
covers three more years). We also observe an increase in the mean lag, altogether implying a 
slower adjustment to a lower long-run level. For firm loans, no such clear pattern is observed. 
Adjustments in long and short-term responses often go both ways. For the firm loans with 
very short maturity there seems to be an increase in sluggishness, while the others exhibit a 
minor drop in their mean adjustment lag. For liabilities, the results indicate a fall in long-term 
pass-through for all term deposits and savings bonds. This is combined with a rise in the 
short-term response for these products. Overall, the adjustment becomes quicker, but smaller. 
A remarkable response is found for the demand and savings deposits. In the EMU era, they no 
longer show any reaction to the respective market rates.  The most common interpretation of 
these findings is that the Belgian corporate lending and deposit markets were already 
contestable and, hence, competitive in the pre-1999 period and that remains the case 
afterwards. On the other hand, the large banks, which dominate Belgian retail banking after 
the merger wave of the late 1990s, may use their market power to adjust their customer retail 
rates more slowly and less completely. Our pass-through results for the Belgian bank market 
lend no support to the conjecture that the single currency may have spurred more cross-border 
(actual or potential) competition. 
                                                 
17 This section contrasts the EMU subsample estimates with those of the whole sample. Comparing with the pre-
EMU estimates does not change any of the conclusions. 
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Robustness: Alternative estimators 
In Appendix A we show that the conclusions based on the measurement results presented 
earlier do not change when considering an alternative weighting of individual coefficients. 
Appendix B analyses to what extent our results suffer from a bias due to the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable in the model or due to nonlinearity of pass-through measures. 
Overall, the analysis and discussion of the respective biases presents some good news for both 
our analysis and possibly for pass-through research in general. Even though there may exist 
some minor differences in point estimation, broad conclusions about the measurement of the 
pass-through do not seem to suffer from lagged dependent variable or nonlinearity bias. 
 
Aggregation bias 
Since much of the empirical pass-through literature is based on aggregated data, it is of 
interest to know to what extent aggregate findings relate to those based on the micro data they 
stem from. Aggregation may bias estimation, especially in dynamic relations (Harvey (1981), 
Barker and Pesaran (1990)). To gain some insight in this respect, we also perform the analysis 
univariately on the aggregate Belgian ECB-retail rates over our sample period. Column 8 in 
Table 5 presents the results. Since the ECB data do not cover all fourteen products in our 
dataset, we can only provide estimates for the available comparable products. The good news 
for studies based on aggregate data is that differences in summary measures such as the mean 
lag seem limited. Turning to point estimates, differences become more substantial and less 
flattering for aggregate studies. Although some of the estimates are in line using either data 
(e.g. long-term pass-through for time deposits is 88% in both cases), lots of aggregate point 
estimates lie outside the confidence intervals surrounding the disaggregated estimates. We 
find systematic underestimation of adjustment coefficients when estimation is based on 
aggregate series. From an economic point of view, too, this is worrisome. Differences in (both 
long and short-term) pass-through often exceed 5%-points, reaching a maximum difference of 
18%-points for the immediate pass-through of time deposits. Figure 3 graphically represents 
the systematic underestimation in adjustment coefficients. Thus, in contrast to the lagged 






Appreciation of the possibility of aggregation bias has spurred pass-through research on 
disaggregate data. However, merely changing the level of aggregation of the data does not 
guarantee to solve the problem. The reason is that banks may well be heterogeneous agents. In 
this subsection we shed light on the importance of this “heterogeneity bias”. We compare 
estimates of a pooled coefficient model to those of the random coefficient model. The former 
imposes parameter equality over all cross-sections and is predominant in the literature. The 
latter allows heterogeneous behaviour between banks and is the preferred model for each 
panel in our analysis (see Table 2). Column 9 in Table 5 presents the results. Long-term pass-
through estimates are rather similar. A few exceptions notwithstanding, this is also the case 
for immediate pass-through estimates (at least from a statistical point of view). Similar to the 
aggregate results, however, we find systematic underestimation of adjustment coefficients in 
estimating the pooled model. The bias in the adjustment coefficient is an indication of large 
underlying differences between banks (see also Chen and Engel (2004)). 
                                                 
18 There might be a concern that, due to the series selection described in Section 2 our data may no longer be 
comparable with the ECB retail rates. As a robustness check, we create mean series from our dataset and 
reinvestigate aggregation bias. All conclusions remain. 
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Illustrations of and theoretical expressions for heterogeneity bias are provided by Robertson 
and Symons (1992), Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1996). Intuitively, both the 
aggregate and the common coefficient approach average the data before estimation, whereas 
the heterogeneous model averages afterwards. Averaging the data before estimation has the 
effect of eliminating heterogeneity. Whenever cross-sectional units are indeed heterogeneous, 
imposing them to behave identically will result in inconsistent estimates. The inconsistency is 
due to the fact that, as heterogeneity is suppressed, it will show up in the residuals. As a 
result, there will be a non-zero correlation between regressors and residuals, thus violating the 
OLS-assumptions. The results in Table 5 show that in our sample the inconsistency is most 
severe in the estimation of adjustment coefficients. Figure 3 visualizes the systematic 
underestimation in adjustment coefficients, by plotting them over the different models. 
 
What the discussion of aggregation and heterogeneity implies for pass-through research is the 
following. From an economic point of view our results indicate that banks respond quicker to 
changing money market rates, and, by implication, to policy rates, than was previously 
believed. Such information is relevant in that it can help understand (lags in) the monetary 
transmission mechanism. One should be careful in interpreting point estimates based on 
aggregate series, as these are potentially misleading. Analysis of disaggregate series 
eliminates aggregation bias, but may still suffer from a bias due to heterogeneity. The solution 
to this problem lies in incorporating heterogeneity into the model. This section does so by 
estimating random coefficients, which also control for measurement error. The following 





4.  Determinants of heterogeneity in pass-through 
 
In this section we attempt to uncover any structural determinants of the differences across 
banks in terms of pass-through. We investigate whether bank characteristics, such as the 
balance sheet structure, the risk profile or the market share of the banks, systematically cause 
a faster or more complete pass-through of market to retail interest rates. We start by 
addressing some methodological issues. Next, we give an overview of the factors that might 
explain cross-bank heterogeneity in adjustment. Subsequently, we estimate the model and 




a)  The estimation procedure 
 
In the previous section we examined the pass-through of market to retail interest rates for a 
number of loan and deposit products. Here the objective is to investigate variation in the pass-
through for the cross-section of banks, using bank-specific characteristics. Because of the 
limited number of banks in the sample and the fact that we do not exploit time variation, we 
apply the following estimation strategy. From section 3 we have both bank-specific and 
average (Swamy or Phillips-Moon) pass-through measures. We use this information to 
investigate whether bank-specific characteristics explain deviations from the average 
behaviour. To this extent, we regress the differences between individual bank and average 
pass-through coefficients on a number of bank characteristics. The characteristics we consider 
are structural in the sense that they capture typical features of banks that do not change very 
much over time, such as balance sheet structure or market position
19. In the analysis, we pool 
along the product dimension, assuming that bank characteristics isomorphically affect the 
pass-through across products. However, we maintain the distinction between loan and deposit 
products, because their pricing may be driven by different factors. Thus, for each of the three 
pass-through measures (the immediate pass-through, the long-run pass-through and the 
adjustment coefficient), we pool the individual deviations from the average estimator into one 
dependent variable across the six loan products and across the eight deposit products. This 
procedure increases the number of observations per cross-sectional regression. Moreover, 
product-specific effects cancel out by considering deviations vis-à-vis the average product-
specific (Swamy or Phillips-Moon) estimates. From an economic point of view, one reason 
for specifying the dependent variable as deviations from the average is that we no longer need 
to incorporate product-specific elements among the explanatory variables. Although this can 
yield interesting results (relating to e.g. market concentration, market rate volatility), such 
regressions could suffer from omitted variable bias by not taking into account, for instance, 
effects of outside competition, which are very hard to measure. As a result, we only focus on 
bank-specific differences in pass-through. 
 
The presence of heteroscedasticity complicates estimation of the model. Within the above 
setup, heteroscedasticity comes into the equation in at least three ways. First, the dependent 
variable contains a parameter estimate that is the result of an individually estimated equation. 
As each of these parameters has a different variance, the homoscedasticity condition will be 
violated. Second, the left hand term also contains the Swamy-estimate, which is a weighted 
                                                 
19 One instance in which such characteristics may change significantly over time is the case of mergers. The fact 
that we treat merged banks as different units before the merger (see Section 2) implies that this effect is taken 
into account in the analysis. 
14average of all individually estimated parameters within a product category. Unless all 
individual coefficient estimates share the same variance, there will be some observation-
specific covariance between the individual and Swamy coefficients. This covariance is a 
second source of heteroscedasticity. Third, all the observations within a product-class have 
some common variance. By pooling over products, each observation will inherit some 
product-specific variance, again causing heteroscedasticity. For a large part, the form of the 
heteroscedasticity is known. Hanushek (1974) shows how to incorporate sampling error of the 
first kind in the model using Feasible Generalized Least Squares. With some minor 
modifications, we extend Hanushek’s method to also capture the second and third kind of 
variance. In addition, following Greene (2000), we compute White-heteroscedasticity-





b)  Bank characteristics and interest rate pass-through 
 
In order to identify the bank characteristics that may influence the pass-through of market to 
retail interest rates, we start from the fact that banks are financial intermediaries; they 
transform deposits into loans. The objective of a bank is to maximize its profits by charging 
loan rates above the risk-free rate and by offering deposit rates below the (interbank) market 
rate. In a complete model, one would need to fully specify the supply and demand schedules 
for both loans and deposits. For our purpose, we borrow from the findings on the price-setting 
behaviour of banks, and hence their incentives to adapt their own loan or deposit rates to 
changing market rates, in three types of literature, i.e. studies on the role of banks in monetary 
transmission (Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Van den Heuvel 
(2002)), studies on the determinants of bank interest margins (Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000)) and the structure-conduct-performance literature in banking (Berger (1995), Vander 
Vennet (2002), Corvoisier and Gropp (2002)). We give a short motivation for each of the 
characteristics and specify their expected sign in the explanation of bank interest rate pass-
through. 
 
The literature concerned with the credit channel of monetary policy transmission has stressed 
the importance of banks’ financial structure, in particular bank capitalization and liquidity, in 
determining their responsiveness to monetary policy. Poorly capitalized (Kishan and Opiela 
(2000)) and illiquid (Kashyap and Stein (2000)) banks are hypothesised to be relatively 
vulnerable to monetary, and by implication, market shocks. Moreover, banks have to maintain 
regulatory capital against their risk-weighted assets, implying that their capacity to expand 
lending depends on their capital adequacy. In line with most other research, we measure the 
capital position of a bank as its capital-to-total-asset ratio. We expect that the capital position 
of a bank and both its lending and deposit interest rate pass-through will be negatively related. 
As a measure of liquidity we include the ratio of cash plus securities over short term deposits 
in the empirical analysis. Similar to equity, we expect liquidity to act as a buffer against 
market fluctuations, implying a negative effect on pass-through. Contrary to most analyses in 
the credit channel literature, we do not consider bank size as a separate characteristic. Both 
from a theoretical and an empirical perspective, bank size is usually considered to proxy for 
some (mostly conjectured) size-related characteristics, for which data are not available. We 
explicitly take into account the effect of these size-related factors, leaving little independent 
scope for bank size in the analysis. 
 
 15Since a bank’s price-setting behaviour is affected by its risk, we include two specific types of 
risk, i.e. default and interest-rate risk, and one general measure of diversification. On the 
lending side, the level of default risk in the loan portfolio will determine the conditions for 
future lending and, consequently, the reaction of the bank to changes in market conditions. A 
bank will only lend to riskier borrowers when it is capable of compensating expected losses 
by charging higher than competitive loan rates. Thus, while the effect of default risk on loan 
rates will be positive, we expect a negative effect on the respective pass-through estimates. In 
the empirical application we approximate default risk by the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total credit. The maturity transformation a bank performs, on the other hand, exposes the 
bank’s profits to fluctuations in market interest rates. The extent of interest-rate risk exposure 
is positively related to the relative importance of interest-sensitive assets and liabilities. 
Similar to Weth (2002), we approximate interest rate risk by the ratio of long-term assets over 
liabilities. The conjectured effect of interest rate risk on pass-through is positive. A bank 
vulnerable to interest rate risk requires lots of hedging activities, whose terms are typically 
closely tied to the market. Finally, we also include a measure of diversification in the analysis 
as an overall indicator of the bank’s riskiness. A bank that is not only active in traditional 
intermediation, but also in other financial services such as insurance, investment banking or 
asset management is assumed to be less vulnerable to shocks in the interest rate environment 
than specialized retail banks. As a measure of diversification, we construct the ratio of non-
interest operating income to total operating income. The expectation is that changing market 
conditions will have only a limited effect on the loan and deposit prices of diversified banks.  
 
Another obvious determinant of bank pricing behaviour is the degree of competition in the 
loan or deposit market. Since Berger and Hannan (1989), tests discerning between the 
structure-conduct-performance and efficiency hypotheses in explaining bank margins and 
bank profitability have attracted considerable interest in empirical banking. Due to the 
construction of our dependent variable as a deviation from group averages and the cross-
sectional nature of the estimation we cannot include a general measure of the bank market 
structure such as a Herfindahl index. Instead we rely on bank-specific indicators of market 
power, i.e. the banks’ market share in the loan or deposit market. The market share measure is 
calculated for each of the loan and deposit products. This is consistent with the relative 
market power hypothesis advanced by Berger (1995) which states that banks with large 
market shares may be able to set interest rates autonomously, especially in an oligopolistic 
bank market structure. We also recall that we control for the effect of product-related 
determinants by considering deviations from the average pass-through measure. A negative 
effect of the market share variable on the pass-through would corroborate the relative market 
power hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is that bank pricing decisions are driven by the 
degree of operational efficiency as opposed to its market power. The rationale is that efficient 
banks will have the incentive to pass this advantage on to their customers in the form of 
below-average lending rates or above-average deposit rates, thereby allowing them to increase 
their market share. We measure the degree of each bank’s operational inefficiency with the 
cost-income ratio and we expect a negative relationship with the estimated pass-through 
intensity. 
 
Finally, similar to Gambacorta (2004), we include two variables in the loan regressions to 
measure possible effects of relationship lending. On the lending side, the percentage of long-
term loans in total loans is intended to proxy for long-term contacts between a bank and its 
customers (see Berger and Udell (1992)). The hypothesis is that relationship banks will tend 
to smooth market shocks for their customers by smoothing interest rates over the business 
cycle. We also include the ratio of demand and savings deposits to total deposits to verify the 
16thesis of Berlin and Mester (1999) who suggest that banks with a stable pool of deposits, 
which leaves them less vulnerable to exogenous interest rate shocks, will provide more loan 
interest rate smoothing. 
 
Inclusion of the above variables also allows us to investigate the importance of some of the 
different channels of monetary policy transmission. The issue has proved to be somewhat 
involving in the literature. The first and most general distinction relates to the money and 
credit view. In the previous section we examined the extent of pass-through. These pass-
through measures give an indication of the combined strength of transmission through all 
channels. In this section, we examine cross-sectional variation in responses of interest rates. 
As the money channel is silent on distributional effects, the search for determinants of 
heterogeneity will shed light only on the credit channel. Within the credit view, we focus on 
the two channels operating through the banking sector.  
 
First and foremost, the bank lending channel posits that in the face of shocks, illiquid banks 
are unable to insulate their loan supply (Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Liquidity can be 
interpreted broadly and should capture at least two possible shock-offsetting mechanisms. 
First, banks with a substantial buffer stock of liquid assets will be more able to sustain lending 
policies, regardless of monetary or market movements. Second, even when such a buffer does 
not exist, some banks are able to fund themselves relatively easily in the deposit market
20. The 
latter source of funds should be accessible especially for well-capitalized banks (Kishan and 
Opiela (2000)). The second subchannel of the credit view we discuss is the bank capital 
channel (e.g. Van den Heuvel (2001)). Via this channel, monetary (and real) shocks affect 
banks’ loan supply by influencing the ability of banks to acquire equity in the face of a capital 
constraint. Monetary shocks, for instance, affect banks’ profitability. A natural channel 
through which this operates is via the maturity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets. Thus, the 
extent to which profits fluctuate with these shocks depends on the amount of interest rate risk 
a bank is exposed to. Banks are able to raise equity only when profits are sufficiently high
21. 




c)  Results 
 
The results are summarized in Table 6. This table shows the estimated coefficients per 
equation horizontally, or per bank characteristic vertically. We also report t-statistics, the 
range of the bank characteristics and the implied differences in pass-through between the 25
th 
and 75
th percentile bank. Recall that 1) the left hand side is specified as deviations from the 
average and 2) the adjustment coefficient is negative, such that a negative effect on this 
measure implies a faster pass-through. 
 
The results show that the baseline model is able to capture heterogeneity mostly for the long-
run pass-through and least for the adjustment coefficient. This finding is in contrast with 
Gambacorta (2004), who finds no fixed heterogeneity in the long run. The rather low 
goodness-of-fit measures in Table 6 are not only a common finding in cross-sectional 
regression, but possibly an indication of random heterogeneity in the adjustment process. As 
Pesaran et al. (1999) suggest random heterogeneity may vanish in the long run. Our finding of 
                                                 
20 This is the point Romer and Romer (1990) make for the banking sector as a whole, but with which credit view 
(bank lending channel in particular) proponents disagree. 
21 This holds regardless of whether equity is financed internally or externally. 
 17considerable unexplained variation in the short run relative to the long run could be an 
indication of such a phenomenon. The constant is insignificant in all regressions. This is due 
to a combination of two factors. First, recall that the dependent variable is specified as the 
bank-specific coefficient minus the Swamy/Phillips-Moon coefficient. Second, in Appendix A 
we show that the Swamy-estimates are not that different from mean-group coefficients. 
Combining both elements, this implies that the left-hand side is demeaned before estimation. 
The fact that the constant is insignificant in the regression of the long-run pass-through 
suggests that the Phillips-Moon estimator, too, is not that different from the mean of the 
individual cointegrating coefficients.  
 
Among the economic variables, we find no evidence confirming the relationship lending 
hypothesis. The long-term loans and core deposit indicators are always insignificant. The 
estimated adjustment coefficient, the coefficient for which the relationship lending hypothesis 
has the clearest prediction (see Berger and Udell (1992)), even has the wrong (negative) sign. 
This finding contrasts with the evidence of Berlin and Mester (1998) for the US. They find 
that banks with a stable pool of core deposits exhibit smoother price setting behaviour. This 
does, however, not necessarily preclude the existence of relationship banking in the Belgian 
market. Relationships can, for instance, manifest themselves in the availability of loans (credit 
lines), rather than in their conditions. 
  
Turning to competition effects, we find that efficiency never induces banks to price more 
competitively. If operational efficiency were to strengthen the pass-through, we would expect 
to find a negative (positive) sign for the cost-income ratio in the regressions with the short-
term or long-term pass-through (adjustment) coefficient as the dependent variable. If 
anything, we find the opposite. But only in the case of the adjustment coefficient for loans (-
0.784) and in the case of the long-term pass-through for deposits (0.598) is the unexpected 
sign significant. Hence, inefficient banks are generally found to mimic market conditions 
more closely than the average bank. For the short-term pass-through on loans, we find that a 
bank with a high market share exploits its market power by following market movements less 
closely (the coefficient is -0.005 and significant). For the long-term pass-through, we find that 
the market share variable is significant at the 10% level only. However, other specifications -
dropping insignificant variables
22- confirm the significantly negative effect of market shares 
on the pass-through. At first sight, the economic significance, measured by the implied 
difference in pass-through between the 25
th and 75
th percentile bank, seems rather small (-
0.021 for the long-term and -0.033 for the short-term pass-through). Notice, however, that the 
distribution of market shares is highly skewed, indicating that market power is concentrated in 
a few banks. The implied difference between the 25
th percentile and the bank with the largest 
market share is as large as 34 basis points in case of the short term pass-through. Market 
shares never influence the adjustment speed in significant ways. In sum, for loans it seems 
that market power will give rise to less competitive pricing policies, strengthening the case for 
the relative market power hypothesis. This may have implications for the application of 
national competition policy in the banking sector. 
 
Credit risk never has a significant impact. First, it could be that default risk is incorporated 
more into bank spreads, rather than in pass-through. Second, it is not implausible that credit 
risk considerations fully play their role in the determination of interest rates charged to the 
least creditworthy borrowers. The interest rates considered here, however, are those charged 
to the most creditworthy borrowers. Table 6 provides evidence that interest rate risk has a 
                                                 
22 Results are available upon request. 
18significantly positive effect on the short-term pass-through of loan rates. This is consistent 
with Weth’s (2002) conjecture: banks with a large interest rate risk exposure require lots of 
hedging activities, whose terms are market-related. In the adjustment coefficient regression 
for both loans and deposits, the diversification measure is highly significant. Regarding the 
sign of the response, Table 6 shows that a high diversification variable increases the 
adjustment coefficient (relative to the average). Thus, the results indicate that diversified 
banks are slower in adjusting retail interest rates in response to changing market conditions. 
Hence, banks that are active in different financial market segments are able to smooth interest 
rate shocks. 
 
Capital is probably the most discerning characteristic in explaining retail bank interest rate 
heterogeneity. The capital variable is negative and very significant in the (long and short-
term) pass-through regressions for both loans and deposits. Well-capitalized banks exhibit 
stickier interest rate setting behaviour. In economic terms, the 25
th percentile bank has a pass-
through that is ten to twenty basis points higher than the 75
th. The results also indicate that 
better capitalized banks are more sluggish in adjusting loan rates to market conditions. 
Liquidity has a similar effect on pass-through as capital, albeit less economically and 
statistically significant. 
 
These results allow some observations regarding the respective channels of monetary 
transmission. The fact that liquidity has a negative effect on loan pass-through (the adjustment 
coefficient is high relative to the mean, implying slower adjustment) is supportive of bank 
lending channel effects. Liquid banks react less to market movements. We also find that the 
pass-through is higher for poorly capitalized banks. This finding is consistent with both the 
bank lending and bank capital channel, which are not mutually exclusive. For the bank 
lending channel to cause this, a well-capitalized bank should have less problems in generating 
liquidity, other than from liquidating its buffer stock. In the US, the typical alternative source 
of liquidity is certificates of deposits. In EMU, and Belgium in particular, the use of such 
certificates is not widespread. The response of the liabilities in the analysis may give a more 
meaningful indication. Indeed, it seems that well-capitalized banks set prices less 
competitively. To the extent that this is due to depositors perceiving these banks as less 
risky
23, this is additional evidence in favour of the bank lending channel. In order to test for 
the bank capital channel, we interact our capital measure with the interest rate risk variable. 
The channel predicts that poorly capitalized banks with a large exposure to interest rate risk 
react more to monetary and market shocks. If the bank capital channel is at work, we should 
find a significantly negative interaction effect. The estimation results (Table 7) show that the 
interaction variable is insignificant and often has the wrong sign. Hence, we find no evidence 
of a bank capital channel in Belgium. Note that in Table 7 the significance of liquidity is 
reduced. While this somewhat weakens the evidence in favour of the bank lending channel, 
the capital variable is still very significant. Recall that, especially since the bank capital 
channel is identified separately, this still supports the bank lending hypothesis, through 






                                                 
23 Kashyap and Stein (1995) show for the US that after a monetary restriction different types of banks face a 
similar drop in deposit quantities. If some banks set prices less competitively, this implies that these banks have 
easier access to alternative deposits, probably because they are perceived as less risky by depositors.  
 195.  Conclusion 
 
We analyse the pass-through of market conditions to retail bank interest rates in Belgium. The 
dataset covers bank-level interest rates for fourteen products, both assets and liabilities, with 
long and short maturities and oriented to both firms and consumers. First, we measure the 
extent of pass-through for each product. Our modelling approach allows for measurement 
error and heterogeneous behaviour among banks, two factors we argue are important in 
working with retail interest rates. On the one hand, measurement error is incorporated because 
typically, bank retail interest rates are composed on the basis of inquiries, rather than being 
directly observed. Heterogeneity, on the other hand, deserves attention because theory does 
not imply all banks should respond in the same fashion. Turning to our results, we find that 
corporate loans adjust both quicker and more complete to changes in money market rates of 
comparable maturity, relative to consumer loans. This finding is possibly a key element in 
understanding aggregate consumption and investment responses to monetary policy. 
Concerning bank liabilities, market rates quickly transmit in both time deposits and savings 
bonds. Demand and savings deposits, however, exhibit a very sluggish response that is far 
from complete. Hence, banks appear to consider the segments of current and savings accounts 
versus time deposits and savings bond as two distinct savings markets. Within each product 
category, we find that the extent of pass-through is positively related to maturity. Second, the 
launch of EMU has generally not resulted in more competitive pricing in the banking market. 
In particular, for consumer loans and demand and savings deposits we find that the pass-
through is more sluggish and less complete in the post 1999 era. Third, we assess the 
importance of four biases that may affect pass-through estimations. We find that lagged 
dependent variable bias and nonlinearity bias are negligible. We do find a role for aggregation 
and heterogeneity bias. Our results indicate, among other things, a systematic underestimation 
of adjustment speeds when the analysis is either based on aggregate data or when the model 
fails to incorporate heterogeneity. Fourth, we verify whether bank-specific determinants can 
explain some of the heterogeneity found in banks’ interest rate setting. We find that banks 
with a relatively high degree of capital coverage and relatively liquid banks exhibit a more 
sluggish and less complete pass-through of market to retail interest rates. These results point 
to the existence of a bank lending channel, rather than a bank capital channel. Furthermore, 
we find that banks with large market shares set prices less competitively, supporting the 
structure conduct-performance hypothesis. This may have implications for the application of 
national competition policy in the banking sector. 
20Bibliography 
 
Angeloni, I., A.K. Kashyap, B. Mojon and D. Terlizzese, 2003, “The output composition 
puzzle: a difference in the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area and U.S.”, ECB 
Working Paper, No. 268 
 
Banerjee, A., 1999, “Panel data unit roots and cointegration: an overview”, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 61, 607-629 
 
Barker, T. and M.H. Pesaran (eds.), 1990, Disaggregation in econometric modelling, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Berger, A.N., 1995, “The profit-structure relationship in banking: Tests of market-power and 
efficient-structure hypotheses”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27, 404-431. 
 
Berger, A.N. and T.H. Hannan, 1989, “The price-concentration relationship in banking”, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 71, 291-299 
 
Berger, A.N. and G.F. Udell, 1992, “Some evidence on the empirical significance of credit 
rationing”, Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1047-1077. 
 
Berlin, M. and L.J. Mester, 1998, "On the Profitability and Cost of Relationship Lending", 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 873-98 
 
Berlin, M. and L.J. Mester, 1999, “Deposits and relationship lending”, Review of Financial 
Studies, 12(3), 579-607 
 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler, 1995, “Inside the black box: the credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 27-48 
 
Borio, C.E.V. and W. Fritz, 1995, “The response of short-term bank lending rates: A cross-
country perspective”, in BIS, Financial structure and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, March, Basle, 106-153  
 
Bruggeman, A. and R. Wouters, 2001, “Determinanten van de debetrentes toegepast door 
Belgische kredietinstellingen”, NBB Working Paper, No. 15. 
 
Chen, S. and C. Engel, 2004, “Does “aggregation bias” explain the PPP puzzle?”, NBER 
Working Paper, No. 10304. 
 
Cook, T. and T. Hahn, 1989, “The effect of changes in the federal funds rate target on market 
interest rates in the 1970s”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 24(3), 331-351 
 
Corvoisier, S. and R. Gropp, 2002, “Bank concentration and retail interest rates”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 26(11), 2155-2189. 
 
Cottarelli, C., G. Ferri, and A. Generale, 1995, “Bank lending rates and financial structure in 
Italy”, IMF Staff Papers, 42(3), 670-700. 
 
 21Cottarelli, C. and A. Kourelis, 1994, “Financial structure, bank lending rates and the 
transmission of monetary policy”, IMF Staff Papers, 41, 587-623 
 
De Bondt, G., 2002, “Retail bank interest rate pass-through: New evidence at the Euro Area 
level”, ECB Working Paper, No. 136 
 
Ellingsen, T. and U. Söderström, 2001, “Monetary policy and market interest rates”, 
American Economic Review, vol. 91(5), 1594-1607. 
 
Engle, R.F. and C.W.J. Granger, 1987, “Cointegration and error-correction: representation, 
estimation and testing”, Econometrica, 55, 251-276 
 
Gambacorta, L., 2004, “How do banks set interest rates?”, NBER Working Paper, No. 10295 
 
Granger, C.W.J., “Long memory relationships and the aggregation of dynamic models”, 
Journal of Econometrics, 14(2), 227-238 
 
Greene, W.H., 2000, Econometric Analysis, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey. 
 
Hannan, T.H. and A.N. Berger, 1991, “The rigidity of prices: Evidence from the banking 
industry”, American Economic Review, 81(4), 938-945. 
 
Hanushek, E.A., 1974, “Efficient estimators for regressing regression coefficients”, The 
American Statistician, 28(2), 66-67 
 
Harvey, A.C., 1981, Time series models, Wiley, New York 
 
Heinemann, F. and M. Jopp, 2002, “The benefits of a working European retail market for 
financial services”, Report for the European Financial Services Roundtable, Brussels, 
January. 
 
Hsiao, C., 2003, Analysis of panel data, Econometric Society monographs, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kashyap, A.K. and J. Stein, 1995, “The impact of monetary policy on bank balance sheets”, 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 42, 151-195 
 
Kashyap, A.K. and J. Stein, 2000, “What do a million observations on banks say about the 
transmission of monetary policy?”, American Economic Review, 90(3), 407-428 
 
Kao, C., 1999, “Spurious Regression and Residual-Based Tests for Cointegration in Panel 
Data”, Journal of Econometrics, 90, 1-44 
 
Kishan, R.P. and T.P. Opiela, 2000, “Bank size, bank capital and the bank lending channel”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32(1), 121-141 
 
Kiviet, J.F. and G.D.A. Phillips, 1994, “Bias assessment and reduction in linear error-
correction models”, Journal of Econometrics, 63, 215-243 
 
22McCoskey, S. and C. Kao, 1999, “Comparing panel data cointegration tests with an 
application to the “twin deficits” problem”, Syracuse University, mimeo 
 
Mizen, P. and B. Hofmann, 2004, “Interest rate pass-through and monetary transmission: 
evidence from individual financial institutions’ retail rates”, Economica, 71, 99-123 
 
Mojon, B., 2000, “Financial structure and the interest rate channel of ECB monetary policy”, 
ECB Working Paper, No. 40 
 
Neumark, D. and S.A. Sharpe, 1992, “Market structure and the nature of price rigidity: 
Evidence from the market of consumer deposits”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 
657-80. 
 
Pedroni, P., 1999, “Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with 
multiple regressors”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, 607-629 
 
Pesaran, M.H., Y. Shin, and R.P. Smith, 1999, “Pooled mean group estimation of dynamic 
heterogeneous panels”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94, 621-634 
 
Pesaran, M.H. and R.P. Smith, 1995, “Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic 
heterogeneous panels”, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 79-113 
 
Pesaran, M.H., R.P. Smith and K.S. Im, 1996, “Dynamic linear models for heterogeneous 
panels”, in Matyas, L. and P. Sevestre (eds.), The Econometrics of Panel Data, Dordrecht, 
145-195 
 
Pesaran, M.H. and Z. Zhao, 1999, “Bias reduction in estimating long-run relationships from 
dynamic heterogeneous panels”, in C. Hsiao, K. Lahiri, L-F Lee and M.H. Pesaran (eds), 
Analysis of Panels and Limited Dependent Variables: A Volume in Honour of G. S. Maddala, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, chapter 12, 297-321. 
 
Phillips, P.C.B. and H.R. Moon, 1999, “Linear regression limit theory for nonstationary panel 
data”, Econometrica, 67, 1057-1111 
 
Robertson, D. and J. Symons, 1992, “Some strange properties of panel data estimators”, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 7, 175-189 
 
Romer, C. and D. Romer, 1990, “New evidence on the monetary transmission mechanism”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, 149-98 
 
Rosen, R.J., 2002, “What goes up must come down? Asymmetries and persistence in bank 
deposit rates”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 21(3), 173-93 
 
Sander, H. and S. Kleimeier, 2004, “Convergence in Eurozone retail banking? What interest 
rate pass-through tells us about monetary policy transmission, competition and integration”, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 23(3), 461-492 
 
Saunders, A. and L. Schumacher, 2000, “The determinants of bank interest margins: An 
international study”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 19, 813-32 
 
 23Stigler, G.J., 1961, “The economics of information”, Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 
213-225 
 
Swamy, P.A.V.B., 1970, “Efficient inference in a random coefficient regression model”, 
Econometrica, 38, 311-323 
 
Van den Heuvel, S., 2001, “The bank capital channel of monetary policy”, University of 
Pennsylvania, mimeo 
 
Van den Heuvel, S., 2002, “Banking conditions and the effects of monetary policy: evidence 
from US states”, University of Pennsylvania, mimeo 
 
Vander Vennet, R., 2002, “Cost and profit efficiency of financial conglomerates and universal 
banks in Europe”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34(1), 254-282. 
 
Weth, M.A., 2002, “The pass-through from market interest rates to bank lending rates in 
Germany”, Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper No.11/02 
 
 
24Figure 1: Summary statistics (see Table 1 for product definitions) 
The figure plots the evolution of the mean product-specific interest rate (solid line) across all banks with reported 
rates in the sample, the evolution of the highest and the lowest (both dashed line) product-specific rate charged 
by any bank in a given month and the evolution of the market interest rate with the same maturity as the specific 
product (dotted ‘+’ line). 
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26 Figure 2: Pass-through: measurement (see Table 1 for product definitions) 
This figure plots the pass-through for the different products. At each date (X-axis, in months) the pass-through 
measures the contribution of a 1%-point permanent increase in the market rate to the bank retail interest rate. 

























































































Figure 3: Adjustment coefficients 
The chart plots the absolute value of the adjustment coefficient in three different pass-through models. The first 
(‘heterogeneous’) measures the pass-through based on disaggregated series and allows for heterogeneous 
behaviour among banks. The second (‘pooled’) estimates the pass-through on disaggregated series, but imposes 
a common reaction for all banks. The third (‘aggregate’) model averages interest rates into one aggregate interest 


























 29Figure 4: Mean-group (dotted ‘+’ line), naïve bias corrected (solid line) and bootstrap corrected pass-
through (broken line) expressed as deviation from the baseline model (see Table 1 for product definitions) 
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Table 1: Product definitions, abbreviations and maturity of the comparable market rates 
Abbreviation   Product  Maturity 
LOANS 
F2Ma Trade  certificates  2  month 
F2Mb  Bank advances on current accounts  2 month 
F6M Term  loan  6  month 
F5Y  Investment loan   5 year 
C3Y  Consumer credit   3 year 
C5Y Mortgage  5  year 
 
DEPOSITS 
TD15D Term  deposits  1  month 
TD3M Term  deposits  3  month 
TD3Y  Term deposits   3 year 
SB1  Savings bonds   1 year 
SB5  Savings bonds  5 year 
SDA  Savings deposits (+ accrual premium)  15 year 
SDL  Savings deposits (+ loyalty premium)  7 year 








Table 2: Average correlation with market rates of different maturity 
LOANS  1 mth  2 mth  3 mth  6 mth  1 y  3 y  5 y  7 y  10 y  15 y 
F2Ma  0,908  0,908  0,903 0,879 0,833 0,727 0,641 0,581 0,514 0,473 
F2Mb  0,894  0,895  0,890 0,872 0,830 0,734 0,664 0,620 0,548 0,511 
F6M  0,929 0,941 0,949 0,961  0,955 0,867 0,761 0,692 0,601 0,552 
F5Y  0,623 0,640 0,653 0,697 0,744 0,885 0,921  0,913 0,878 0,841 
C3Y  0,662 0,666 0,667 0,687 0,699 0,770 0,801 0,814  0,801 0,792 
C5Y  0,666 0,679 0,687 0,721 0,754 0,849 0,880  0,868 0,845 0,819 
 
DEPOSITS  1 mth  2 mth  3 mth  6 mth  1 y  3 y  5 y  7 y  10 y  15 y 
TD15D  0,910  0,908 0,904 0,889 0,852 0,746 0,670 0,624 0,557 0,524 
TD3M  0,911 0,915 0,917  0,912 0,886 0,784 0,701 0,651 0,572 0,533 
TD3Y  0,751 0,772 0,789 0,840 0,891 0,974  0,965 0,929 0,874 0,830 
SB1  0,920 0,936 0,946 0,969 0,976  0,921 0,835 0,770 0,686 0,636 
SB5  0,637 0,654 0,669 0,721 0,775 0,923 0,977  0,976 0,958 0,933 
SDA  -0,027 -0,051 -0,067 -0,084 -0,106 0,113  0,316  0,436  0,519  0,570 
SDL  0,674 0,670 0,666 0,670 0,664 0,712 0,742 0,772  0,757 0,759 
DD  0,489 0,486 0,484 0,497 0,505 0,577 0,628 0,664 0,684 0,698 
Note: For each product the maturity (when specified) of the reference contract is indicated by a coloured cell. 
The bold numbers indicate the maximum correlation per product. 
 
32 
Table 3: Likelihood ratio tests: Random versus pooled coefficient model 
LOANS LR 
Critical 
value DEPOSITS  LR 
Critical 
value 
F2Ma  138,79 65,17  TD15D  777,65 101,88 
F2Mb  454,31 110,90  TD3M  864,82 119,87 
F6M  262,49 69,83  TD3Y  222,08 101,88 
F5Y  240,77 74,47  SB1  212,18 106,39 
C3Y  274,73 83,68  SB5  256,76 115,39 
C5Y  127,01 101,88  SDA  81,74 68,67 
    SDL  238,57 110,90 
       DD  77,68 26,30 
Note: The table shows the likelihood ratio and the corresponding 5% Chi-square critical value. A value above 
the critical value indicates the restrictions of the pooled model are not valid. 
 
 
Table 4: Cointegration tests 
LOANS  mean(ADF) t-stat  DEPOSITS  mean(ADF) t-stat 
F2Ma  -2,4031 -1,658  TD15D  -4,6716 -14,785 
F2Mb  -2,3933 -2,1483  TD3M  -4,8777 -17,3881 
F6M  -5,5363 -16,0173  TD3Y  -4,4054 -13,297 
F5Y  -4,0608 -9,6107  SB1  -4,4854 -14,0676 
C3Y  -3,045 -5,1239  SB5  -3,7246 -10,148 
C5Y  -3,2963 -7,0992  SDA  -2,3085 -1,4616 
    SDL  -2,3702 -2,0133 
       DD  -2,7836 -2,0659 
Note: Mean Augmented Dickey Fuller t-statistics and corrected t-statistics. The performed correction is n
0.5 * 
(mean(ADF)- µ)/ σ and uses µ = -2.026 and σ = 0.82 (see McCoskey and Kao (1999) for further details). 
 
 
Note: reading Table 5 below 
The table consists of two parts, one for loans and one for deposits. Each coloured row 
contains the point estimates for one (product) panel. Within a panel, we restrict attention to 
the main coefficients of interest, i.c. the immediate pass-through, the long-run pass-through 
and the adjustment coefficient. We also report mean adjustment lags. Column 3 contains the 
actual point estimates. The adjacent Column 4 presents standard errors on these coefficients. 
In Column 5 we report -in percentages- how much of these standard errors is due to parameter 
heterogeneity. The remaining proportion is mere parameter uncertainty. Column 6 and 7 
contain mean-group and Kiviet-Phillips corrected estimates of the dynamic parameters. The 
former equally weighs individual cross-section coefficients, while the latter corrects for the 
bias due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable. Column 8 presents the point 
estimates of the dynamic model when applied to the aggregate retail interest rates, provided 
by the ECB. Column 9 contains the results based on the disaggregate series, but imposing 
equal dynamic behaviour over cross-sections. Finally, the right hand panel of each table 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 APPENDIX A:  
Mean-group estimates 
All estimates of dynamic random coefficients referred to in the text are estimated as proposed 
by Swamy (1970). This subsection compares the (Swamy) measurement results with the 
estimated pass-through based on the mean-group estimator (Pesaran and Smith (1995)). The 
difference between the two estimators is the way in which individual cross-section 
coefficients are weighted. While the mean-group estimator simply averages (resulting in a 
simple to implement procedure), Swamy gives more weight to those coefficients that are 
estimated more precisely (improving efficiency of the estimator). We expect differences to be 
limited, as in composing the data we require every cross-section to exceed a minimum 
number of observations.  This eliminates imprecisely estimated individual equations from the 
averaging of coefficients, and thus narrows the difference between the two estimators (having 
a proportionately larger effect on the mean-group estimator). As long-run coefficients are 
estimated as suggested by Phillips and Moon (1999), changing the weighting of individual 
dynamic coefficients from (1) does not alter these.  
 
Column 6 in Table 5 and Figure 4 (dotted ‘+’ line) summarize the results. Differences in 
estimated coefficients, measured by (the absolute value of) the relative deviation of the mean 
group point estimate from the Swamy estimate, often approach ten percent. These differences 
are limited in the sense that the mean group estimates never lay outside the Swamy 
confidence intervals. Moreover, in constructing measures of the pass-through, Figure 4 shows 
that hardly any differences emerge. This implies that our results are robust to minor changes 




This appendix investigates the importance of both the lagged dependent variable and the 
nonlinearity bias. Both these biases are theoretically plausible in a pass-through context. We 
here give an indication of their empirical relevance in estimation of the pass-through. 
 
Lagged dependent variable bias 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable among our regressors possibly biases the 
estimates of models such as (1). This bias is present in univariate autoregressive models, is 
exacerbated in “large n, small T” panels -where it is known as the Nickel (1981) bias- and 
might play a more limited role in panels having a large time dimension. In this subsection we 
assess whether this bias poses a problem for pass-through estimates. We implement the Kiviet 
and Phillips (1994) bias corrections on the estimated coefficients and recompute the pass-
through. 
 
Comparing Columns 3 and 7 in Table 5 shows that coefficients hardly change as a result of 
the bias correction. The bias never seems to affect a coefficient more than two percent relative 
to its uncorrected value. The apparent irrelevance of the lagged dependent variable bias may 
be due to a relatively long sample in the preceding estimations. As Kiviet and Phillips (1994) 
show, the bias vanishes as T increases. Although we do not conduct a full-blown analysis of 
the bias, trying to detect at what sample size this bias becomes important, we might get some 
indication in our EMU-period sub-sample estimations. These estimations are based on series 
with a time dimension of maximum four years. Column 13 (relative to Column 10) in Table 5 
shows that although they are somewhat larger than for the whole sample, bias corrections 
 39remain limited. The reason is probably that forty-eight observations are still enough to render 




In general, the pass-through is a highly nonlinear function of estimated parameters. There are 
two exceptions, for which the pass-through is estimated directly: the immediate impact on the 
one hand, and the long-run effect in case of cointegration on the other. All other measures of 
transmission are possibly contaminated with a bias due to nonlinearity. Within a framework 
similar to ours, Pesaran and Zhao (1999) suggest several correction methods, of which we 
implement two. The alternative estimators correct for both the lagged dependent and the 
nonlinear bias.  
 
Figure 4 plots the difference between the bias-corrected and the baseline pass-through 
estimates. The graph reveals that the small changes due to the lagged dependent variable bias 
correction hardly affect the pass-through (solid line). As Pesaran and Zhao (1999) show, this 
“naïve” corrected estimator performs rather poorly. They prefer a bootstrap correction, which 
is also shown in the figure, by the broken line. Within the Engle-Granger procedure, the long-
run effect is estimated directly. Hence, there is no bias due to nonlinearity in this coefficient. 
This is also apparent in the figure, where the corrected estimator ultimately converges to the 
uncorrected estimate. Intermediate estimates exhibit the largest bias within one to six months. 
Overall, the bias is small. From a statistical point of view, the corrected pass-through always 
lies within the confidence regions of Figure 2. From an economic perspective too, the bias -
showing a (absolute) maximum of less than three percentage points- does not seem to have an 
impact on any of the conclusions. 
 
 
Overall, the previous analysis and discussion of the respective biases presents some good 
news for pass-through research in general. Even though there may exist some minor 
differences in point estimation, broad conclusions about the measurement of the pass-through 
do not seem to suffer from lagged dependent variable or nonlinearity bias. It should be noted, 
however, that these results are not necessarily extendable to research based on very short 
samples, nor are they guaranteed to be valid within pooled estimations. 
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